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Executive Summary
This paper seeks to determine the effects of state budget changes on local government
expenditures; particularly, how changes in state funding provided to local governments affects
local government expenditures. The hypothesis tested is that state funding is a significant factor
on local government expenditure. To evaluate this, two levels of analysis were conducted. The
first was a paneled fixed effects regression analysis of data for all fifty states from the years 2000
to 2013, in which changes to local expenditure were measured by the effects of multiple fiscal
and socioeconomic variables. The second level of analysis evaluated the same effects during the
same time period using the same method, but for county level expenditures for the state of New
York.
The results from the analysis showed that, at both the national level for all states and the
New York state level for all counties, state aid or transfers to local governments was a
statistically significant factor on local expenditures. The data for all fifty states showed that for
every $100 increase in per capita state intergovernmental revenue, per capita local expenditures
increased by $116, or that a 6.8% change in state IG revenue results in a 2.3% change in local
expenditure. For the county level data for New York, the analysis showed that for every $100
increase in per capita state aid, per capita local expenditures increased by approximately $45, or
that a 40% change in state aid results in a 2.5% change in local expenditures.
These results would support our hypothesis that state funding, either through direct aid or
other intergovernmental revenue transfer mechanisms, is a significant factor on local government
spending on projects and services; as such, it can be assumed that when state governments
reduce their budgets, local governments see their ability to fund projects and services reduced
without resorting to another funding mechanism.
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Problem Statement
In the United States, 49 out of 50 states have some form of a balanced budget
requirement as reported by the National Conference of State Legislatures. The rules behind these
requirements vary from state to state, but the intention is the same – by being required to keep
balanced budgets, states are theoretically able to ensure that government operations are occurring
efficiently and affordably. However, an issue that is frequently discussed is the effect that the
outcomes of balanced budgeting has on local governments – often, states balance their budgets
by cutting spending to various programs, which in turn causes local governments who were no
longer getting funding from the states to adapt. Sometimes, this comes in the form of litigation or
legislative action, such as in Ohio, where a governor’s veto of $80 million to education spending
was later reversed. More often, however, local governments are forced to make funding
adjustments to react to the shortfall from state cuts.
What I would like to determine is the net effect of balanced budget requirements on local
governments and citizens. Specifically, I would like to know if cutting spending to create a
balanced state budget requires local governments to make potentially negative changes to
account for the reduction in state spending.
The way that I will conduct this research this is to measure the effect of changes to state
budgeting on local governments. When states reduce expenditures, particularly in terms of
transfers to local governments, how does it impact changes in local government? Does it affect
local government expenditure, which could in turn affect the amount of services provided to
citizens? I will be using fiscal and socioeconomic data from all states for several years to try to
measure these effects.
There is a significant policy issue at stake. If cutting spending at the state level to balance
the budget is having an overall negative effect within the state enacting the budget cuts, perhaps
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a different method of balancing budgets (or even budgeting overall) should be considered to
make sure that the state budget is being created and maintained in a way that benefits citizens
rather than harms them. While it may be politically expedient to be able to say “we balanced the
budget,” from a practical standpoint it should be examined to make sure that these types of
requirements are having the positive effects that we would hope to achieve through the budgeting
process.
Literature Review
Many of the research articles on this topic were written from the early to mid-1960s;
more recent articles addressing this issue do not examine the same topic researched here. With
that in mind, this review includes directly relevant articles (journal articles and otherwise).
Charles Tiebout’s 1956 article “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures” examined the
model of public goods and how citizens voice their preferences for public goods. Unlike
previous research, which had assumed that the federal government primarily handled public
goods spending, Tiebout made the case that local expenditures on public goods were more
important for measuring people’s preferences, because citizens are more likely and able to
choose communities whose public goods provision better reflect their preferences. (Tiebout,
1956). This article establishes the importance of goods and services provided by local
government; when noting the effect of state government fiscal changes on local governments,
acknowledging that importance of local government expenditure is necessary.
Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris (1964) looked to build on research by Fisher (1957), in
which Fisher found that because the variation of state and local expenditures explained by
population, urbanization, and income had been reduced since 1942, there must be some
unexplained variation. The authors attempted to account for that “unexplained variation” by
measuring federal aid to state governments and state aid to local governments using data from
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1960, finding that “state aid often reduces pressures on local governments to hold their
expenditures down” (Sacks and Harris 1964).
In the same issue of the National Tax Journal as the Sacks and Harris article, Glenn
Fisher wrote an updated version of his research, which expanded on his initial research also
using data from 1960 to try to explain more of the variance by expanding the number of
variables - this article was also intended as a rebuttal to the Sacks and Harris article, arguing that
“the statistical procedures used overstate the importance of federal aid as a cause of variation in
expenditure” (Fisher 1964). Fisher found a high negative correlation between levels of
expenditure and percent of low income families in the state, putting forth the hypothesis that
low-income families are more politically resistant to higher expenditure if that expenditure
results in higher taxes. He also concluded that the use of federal aid as an independent variable is
likely invalid, but that state aid to local government “should be included in future studies of this
type” (Fisher 1964).
Moving ahead to 1988, John Wallis and Wallace Oates (1988) chapter, “Decentralization
in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government,” from an out of print
book called Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, used a collection of Census data to model
the trend of fiscal responsibility moving from local governments to the states at the first half of
the 20th century. This data was used to measure the halt of that trend and predicting the potential
of fiscal decentralization away from the states at the end of the 20th century (Wallis and Oates
1988). This research on the fluctuation in the relationship between state and local government
expenditures could be useful in noting recent trends in state and local spending and how local
governments react to fiscal changes in different economic and political climates.

5

Poterba’s (1994) article, “State Responses to Fiscal Crises,” examined how state fiscal
decisions are affected by fiscal rules and political factors. However, Poterba didn’t look at the
relationship between state and local governments when fiscal changes occur. The primary
finding of this paper was that state fiscal rules such as balanced budget amendments and
spending limits have significant effects on the ability of states to respond unexpected fiscal
shocks. It also noted the importance of political factors, such as party control of the state house
and the governorship and whether it is a gubernatorial election year when the shock occurs
(Poterba 1994). Although the article does not specifically apply to the relationship between state
and local governments, it did generate some good ideas for which explanatory variables might be
considered.
In 1995, Poterba followed up his 1994 article with “Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal
Policy: Evidence from the States” in the National Tax Journal. In response to the discussion of a
federal balanced budget amendment, Poterba looked at the effects of balanced budget rules at the
state level to determine their effects on fiscal policy to determine whether there are any
implications that should be noted when considering a federal balanced budget rule. An important
distinction that he notes in this article is that when states report that they faced prospective
deficits, much of the action that they take to close these potential deficits occurs through
spending cuts, followed (in a distant second) by revenue increases, and finally by “other actions”
such as changes in the accounting process (Poterba 1995).
Reschovsy (2003) attempted to measure the impact of state government budget shortfalls
on local governments. By analyzing previous behavior of state governments in response to
budget crises, Reschovsky concludes that “in many states, aid to local governments and school
districts will be reduced by a greater percentage amount than reductions in overall state
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spending” and that “it is likely that many of these cuts in state aid will translate into reductions in
public services.” (Reschovsky 2003).
Greer and Denison (2016) provide the most recent research on this topic. They examine
the distribution of debt between state and local governments, and measure the factors that affect
how states and localities determine who will take on the most debt concentration. (Greer and
Denison 2016). Their research adds a further layer of consideration on the relationship between
state and local fiscal determinations, as well as provided further potential explanatory variables
to measure in my own research with the inclusion of the concentration of debt at both the state
and local level.
Research Design
My research attempts to measure the balance of fiscal responsibility and program funding
implementation between state and local governments. The goal is to see if, when states cut
spending to balance their budgets, local governments must react in such a way that the positive
effects of a balanced state budget are offset. This was examined to an extent by Poterba (1995),
who found that when states are faced with potential deficits, most of the action taken to offset
this deficit occurs through spending cuts. Additionally, Rechovsky (2003) concluded that states
faced with budget crises reduced aid to local governments and school districts by a greater
amount than reductions in overall state spending.
I further examine this issue by looking at how local governments respond to changes in
state level spending. This is done with two levels of data. First, I perform a fixed effects panel
regression analysis of all fifty states from the years 2000 to 2013 using a combination of fiscal
data from the Urban Institute’s Tax Policy Center (Urban Institute 2015) and socioeconomic and
political data from the University of Kentucky Poverty Research Center (UK Center for Poverty
Research 2016). This data is aggregated total local expenditure, total local revenue, local
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property tax, local outstanding debt and the change in local debt during a given year; I will also
include data for total state revenue, total state expenditure, gross state product, unemployment
rate, state outstanding debt, the change in state debt during a given year and total state
intergovernmental revenue; and political data such as whether the Governor is a Democrat and
whether Democrats have greater than fifty percent control over the state House and Senate. All
of my included fiscal data is per capita. My hypothesis is that state aid significantly affects the
amount of local expenditures in a given year, and that this will be reflected both in national data
and at the county level.
Once I have outcomes for the state level data, I repeat the regression analysis for a single
state at the county level to determine if similar results occur. For this, I will evaluate the state of
New York; I chose New York because of their extensive reporting on county fiscal information
for multiple years, as reported by the Office of the Comptroller (New York OSC, 2017). I chose
county level government data because there is uniformity in the structure of county governments
compared to city governments, which can have different structures even within a single state.
Measuring state level data will allow me to establish patterns that might support my hypothesis,
and county level data measurements will be used to verify whether those patterns and the
hypothesis hold.
State Level Analysis
The first level of analysis conducted was a fixed effects panel regression on data for all
fifty states from 2000 to 2013 (because there was missing data for some variables for the years
2001 and 2003, those years were omitted from my state level analysis). For lag purposes, I also
collected data for 1999, but did not include 1999 in the regression year. For the regression, my
dependent variable is the total aggregate amount of local expenditures per capita in real dollars
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(for the remainder of my analysis, all fiscal variables are per capita in real dollars). My
independent variables are state population, state unemployment rate, total state expenditure, total
local revenue, percent change state debt, percent change local debt, total state intergovernmental
revenue (in this dataset, “total state intergovernmental revenue” is the name given to the revenue
that local governments get from the states), whether the governor is a Democrat (a binary
variable which is 1 if the governor is a Democrat), and whether the Democrats hold the majority
in the state Senate and state House (each is a binary variable created using data regarding the
percentage of Democrats in each chamber, where the variable is equal to 1 if the percentage is
greater than fifty percent).
Before conducting my regression analysis, I first did a summary analysis of my data in
order to get a better overall view of the information I gathered. The summary analysis returned
the results seen in Table 1.
Table 1. State Level Summary Statistics (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars)
Variable Mean
Total Local Expenditure
Total State Expenditure
Total Local Revenue
Total State IG Revenue
Local Property Tax
Total State Revenue
State Population
State Unemployment Rate
Governor is a Democrat (1 if yes)
Democrats Control House (1 if yes)
Democrats Control Senate (1 if yes)
Percent Change Local Debt
Percent Change State Debt

5089.52
6346.95
4696.75
1464.07
1242.19
6598.64
5981439
.0592
.4643
.5356
.4929
.0158
.0889

Standard
Deviation
2612.98
1872.05
1195.50
480.45
532.98
2359.75
6585855
.0209
.4991
.4991
.5003
.0623
.5545

Min

Max

1992
3805
1817
161
244
1632
494300
.023
0
0
0
-.2507
.-8517

24163
19293
9751
3497
3001
25678
38414128
.137
1
1
1
.2642
5.343

Assuming that local expenditures will change as a reaction to the previous year’s fiscal
variables, I lagged all the fiscal independent variables by one year; in addition, I lagged the
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political variables by one year since budgets are previously made for the next fiscal year in the
current fiscal year. This resulted in every variable except for population and unemployment rate
being lagged, and the regression equation is as follows:
TotalLocalExpenditurei,t = αi + β1TotalLocalRevenuei,t-1 + β2TotalStateRevenuei,t-1 +
β3TotalStateExpenditurei,t-1 + β4LocalPropertyTaxi,t-1 + β5GovernorisaDemocrati,t-1 +
β6UnemploymentRatei,t + β7Populationi,t + β8DemocratControlHousei,t-1 +
β9DemocratControlSenatei,t-1 + β10ChangeLocalDebti,t-1 +
β11ChangeStateDebtOutstandingi,t-1 + β12TotalStateIGRevenuei,t-1 + εi,t
My expectation was that the variables for state expenditure, local revenue, state
intergovernmental revenue, and local property tax will be significant, as well as the variable for a
Democratic Governor and Democratic control of the House; the first four variables I expected
significance from due to either the direct effect on local funds available for expenditure or the
effect on the amount of state funds available to potentially use to increase transfers to local
governments, while the two political variables reflect the fact that the House is primarily the
budget making body in a state and the Governor sets the economic policy agenda, and in both
instances Democrats are more likely to approve greater state level spending overall which could
possibly include transfers to local governments. These expectations were somewhat accurate, as
reflected in the analysis in Table 2.
Prior to running my regression, I ran a variance inflation factor command to catch any
potential multicollinearity issues. The VIF returned nothing of significant magnitude. With this
being the case, I proceeded with my fixed effects regression, which produced the results seen in
Table 2.
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Table 2. State Level Regression Analysis (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars)
R-sq: Within
= 0.4153
Between = 0.0278
Overall = 0.0307
Total Local Expenditures Coef.
Total State Expenditure (lag)
Total Local Revenue (lag)
Total State IG Revenue (lag)
Local Property Tax(lag)
Total State Revenue (lag)
State Population
State Unemployment Rate
Governor is a Democrat (1 if
yes, lag)
Democrats Control House (1 if
yes, lag)
Democrats Control Senate (1 if
yes, lag)
Local debt change (lag)
State debt change (lag)

Number of obs
Number of Groups

= 400
= 50

T

p>|t|

-.1053
.1105
1.159
.4862
.0012
-.0002
5965.42
-6.935

Robust
Std.Err.
.0493
.0945
.1598
.1996
.0197
.0001
1906.69
26.255

-2.14
1.17
7.26
2.44
0.06
-3.19
3.13
-0.26

0.038
0.024
0
0.019
0.950
0.002
0.003
0.793

95% confidence
interval
-.2044 -- -.0062
-.0794 -- .3004
.8386 -- 1.481
.0851 -- .8872
-.0384 -- .0408
-.0003 -- -.0001
2133.77 -- 9797.07
-59.696 -- 45.826

141.77

72.1994

1.96

0.055

-3.319 -- 286.861

-84.966

62.992

-1.35

0.184

-211.554 -- 41.622

436.569
427.586

192.3958
298.3009

2.27
1.43

0.028
0.158

49.935 -- 823.203
-171.872 -- 1027.044

The statistically significant explanatory variables for aggregate total local expenditure are
total state expenditure, total state IG revenue, aggregated local property tax, state population,
state unemployment rate, Democratic control of the House, and aggregated local debt change.
Total state expenditure and total local expenditures are negatively correlated. This could be
because as states increase their total expenditures, local governments do not need to spend as
much on provision of services or capital projects that the state would pick up, therefore total
local expenditure decreases.
Total state IG revenue is positively correlated. This is the outcome my hypothesis predicted –
as states increase the amount of revenue they provide to local governments, the amount of
funding that local governments have to spend is increased, which leads to an increase in local
expenditures.
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Aggregated local property tax is positively correlated. Property taxes are a significant
revenue function for local governments; it is reasonable to expect that increasing local property
tax increases the amount of local funds to spend, and similarly raises local expenditures.
State population and local expenditures are negatively correlated; as the state population goes
up, the amount of revenue collected by the state overall may increase, which in turn would allow
states to increase expenditures – as noted, state expenditure and local expenditure are also
negatively correlated.
In discussing the state unemployment rate, it is important to note the variables in the dataset
are presented as percentages, so a 5% unemployment rate is reflected in the data as 0.05 rather
than 5; to analyze the size of the coefficient on the dependent variable, the decimal of the
coefficient must be shifted to the left two digits, meaning that a 1% increase in the
unemployment rate increases local expenditure by approximately $60 rather than $6,000. It can
be assumed that, as the unemployment rate in a state goes up, more people are seeking services
both at the state and local level, and therefore local expenditures would increase as a result.
Democratic control of the House is positively correlated. The state House is typically the
primary body responsible for crafting the state budget (and Democrats are more likely generally
to approve spending increases, including increases to local government funding), as such, it is
reasonable to expect that Democratic control of the state House would increase local funds
provided by the state, thereby increasing local expenditures as a result.
Aggregated local debt change, like unemployment rate, is a percentage, so local expenditure
would increase by approximately four dollars for every percent increase in local debt –
presumably because local debt can be accrued to have funds to spend on capital projects or
expansion of services.
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Since the variable of interest in the hypothesis was total state intergovernmental revenue, the
coefficient for Total State IG Revenue is the effect we would like to measure. The analysis
shows that for every dollar increase in per capita state intergovernmental revenue, per capita
local expenditure goes up by approximately $1.16. Another way to view this relationship is to
measure the percent change of state intergovernmental revenue relative to local expenditure. To
do this, we will first consider the means of our statistics from our summary analysis. The average
amount of per capita total local expenditure is approximately $5,090; the average amount of per
capita state intergovernmental revenue is approximately $1,464. We will simplify our percentage
change equation by multiplying the coefficient amount by $100, so for every $100 increase in
per capita state intergovernmental revenue, per capita local expenditure goes up by $116. This
would mean that if average state intergovernmental revenue increases from $1,464 to $1,564 (a
6.8% change), average local expenditure would increase from $5,090 to $5,206 (a 2.3% change).
Therefore, a 6.8% change in state intergovernmental revenue would result in a 2.3% change in
local expenditures.
County Level Analysis
For my second level of analysis, I wanted to test my findings for the state level data on
county level data from a single state, which would allow me to capture the variance between
local governments within a state. The database used for this analysis was compiled of yearly
reports from the New York Office of the Comptroller, with state level variables merged into the
table from my initial dataset. Like my first dataset, my analysis will be for the years 2000
through 2013 (again, data was collected for the year 1999 for lag purposes but not included in the
analysis).
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The variables I initially included for this analysis are local total expenditures, total state
expenditures, local revenue, state revenue, total state aid, county population, state population,
amount of local property tax collected, gross state product, state unemployment rate, local
unemployment rate, state debt change percentage, local debt change percentage, and whether or
not the Governor is a Democrat in a given year. Running summary statistics for this dataset
produced the results in Table 3.
Table 3. County Level Summary Statistics (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars)
Variable Mean
Local Total Expenditures
Total State Expenditure
Local Revenue
Total State Revenue
Total State Aid
County Population
State Population
Local Property Tax
Gross State Product
State Unemployment Rate
Local Unemployment Rate
Percent State Debt Change
Percent Local Debt Change
Governor is a Democrat

1783.89
8540.96
1238.76
8652.07
247.95
193601.1
19263081.21
346.27
53853.37
.0632
.0629
.0154
.7480
.5

Standard
Deviation
494.83
860.46
412.72
1511.88
60.36
298831
204505.3
144.63
7371.48
.0517
.0196
.0273
11.27
.5003

Min

Max

722.05
6901
581.40
5181
101.49
4836
19001780
111.21
42994.87
.045
.024
-.0337
-1
0

4731.52
9762
3927.55
10904
683.63
1493350
19691032
1321.87
65320.46
.086
.128
.0721
285.21
1

Similarly to the first model, I conducted a VIF test to check for multicollinearity prior to
conducting my regression. Running the VIF found that Gross State Product was causing
multicollinearity issues; removing the variable eliminated the issue, so it is omitted from the
regression analysis. This leaves the final regression equation as follows:
LocalTotalExpenditurei,t = αi + β1LocalRevenuei,t-1 + β2TotalStateAidi,t-1 +
β3CountyPopulationi,t + β4StatePopulationi,t + β5GovernorisaDemocrati,t-1 +
β6PercentLocalDebtChangei,t-1 + β7PercentStateDebtChangei,t-1 +
β8StateUnemploymentRatei,t + β9LocalUnemploymentRatei,t + β10TotalStateRevenuei,t-1 +
β11TotalStateExpenditurei,t-1 + β12LocalRealPropertyTaxi,t-1 + εi,t

14

In this model, I expected to see significance in the local revenue variable, the total state
aid variable, the variable for total state expenditure, and the variable for local property tax – this
is due to the fact that these are the variables that I would expect to directly affect the amount of
funds that local governments have available for expenditure. One difference of note about this
regression is that I have omitted the variables for Democratic control of the House and the Senate
that were included in the regression for all states; this is because there was no variation in House
or Senate control for New York in the given time period so the variable would be unchanging,
and therefore does not need to be included in the analysis. With the necessary variables included,
my regression produced the results in Table 4.
Table 4: County Level Regression Analysis (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars)
R-sq: Within
= 0.8306
Between = 0.3142
Overall = 0.4476
Local Total Expenditures Coef.
Local Revenue (lag)
Total State Aid (lag)
County Population
State Population
Governor is a Democrat (1 if
yes, lag)
Percent Local Debt Change
(lag)
Percent State Debt Change
(lag)
State Unemployment Rate
Local Unemployment Rate
Total State Revenue (lag)
Total State Expenditure (lag)
Local Real Property Tax
(lag)

Number of obs
Number of Groups

= 728
= 57

T

p>|t|

95% confidence interval

.7811
.4530
-.0010
-.0001
127.30

Robust
Std.Err.
.1364
.1926
.0007
.0001
29.298

5.73
2.35
-1.36
-0.80
4.35

0
0.022
0.018
0.425
0

.5078 -- 1.0544
.0673 -- .8388
-.0025 -- .0005
-.0002 -- .0001
68.609 -- 185.991

.9126

.2502

3.65

0.001

.4113 -- 1.414

341.93

479.30

0.71

0.479

-618.233 -- 1302.112

481.033
-1980.903
.0013
.0623
-.1004

1243.752
1033.681
.0053
.0309
.2137

0.39
-1.92
0.24
2.01
-0.47

0.7
0.06
0.812
0.049
0.64

-2010.502 -- 2972.568
-4051.616 -- 89.809
-.0094 -- .0119
.0002 -- .1243
-.5285 -- .3277

The statistically significant variables that the model produced are local revenue, total state
aid, Governor is a Democrat, percent of local debt change, and total state expenditure.
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Local Revenue is positively correlated. As local governments earn more revenue, they have
more funds to spend; therefore, local expenditures might increase as a result.
Total state aid is also positively correlated. This is the result my hypothesis predicted – as
states provide more aid to local governments, they can increase their spending.
Initially, I thought the positive correlation of the Governor being a Democrat was a political
impact; Democratic governors are typically more likely to approve budgets that would include
more state level spending, including spending in aid to local governments. While this may be
true, what might be captured in this analysis is time related. Prior to 2006, New York had a
Republican governor; after 2006, New York had a Democratic Governor. This variable might be
noticing the fluctuations in expenditures prior to 2006 (after 9/11 but before the recession) and
after 2006 (the recession and its aftermath).
Percent of local debt change is positively correlated. If a local government takes on more
debt, they are possibly doing so to spend on projects or services.
Unlike in the state level model, total state expenditure here is positively correlated. Since
total state expenditures include state aid to local governments, it could be possible that as state
expenditure increases, state aid to local governments might be a part of that increase, and as such
the amount of funds that local governments have available to spend would also increase. The
difference in the direction of the correlation here could be a reflection that more states overall see
a negative correlation between these two variables, but that New York is one of the states in the
minority in this aspect; it could also be that county level governments are more likely to have a
positive correlation between these variables than other levels of local government.
To account for the effects of state aid on local government expenditures, we would consider
the coefficient of the variable Total State Aid on local expenditure, which is 0.453. This shows
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that, per capita, for every dollar increase in total state aid to local governments, local government
expenditure increases by approximately forty-five cents.
Like the first analysis, I will measure the percent change of total state aid relative to the
percent change to local expenditure. From our summary statistics, the average per capita local
total expenditure amount is approximately $1,784. The average per capita amount of state aid is
approximately $248. Because every dollar of state aid increases local expenditure by forty-five
cents, we will assume for every $100 increase in state aid, local expenditure increases by $45.
Next, we will measure the percentage change. Using average state aid, a $100 increase will raise
average state aid from $248 to $348. Therefore, the percentage change from the original amount
to the amount with $100 in aid is approximately 40%. Next, we will assume that the $100
increase in state aid created a $45 increase in local total expenditure; this takes the average local
total expenditure from $1,784 to $1,829, a percentage change of approximately 2.5%. Therefore,
we can assume that, when the state adjusts aid to local governments by 40 percent, the average
change to local government expenditure is 2.5 percent.
State/County Comparison
The patterns of the effects established in the analysis can also be found in the analysis at
the county level. Many of the same variables that are significant in the initial analysis are
significant in the second analysis; importantly, the variables of interest in both analyses – state
intergovernmental revenues and state aid to county governments – are statistically significant.
The primary difference to note between these two analysis models is the magnitude of the
effect of a change in aid to local governments. There are several reasons why this might be
occurring. It could be based in the data used in the models; where the state level model
aggregates all levels of local spending, it could be capturing levels of local government where
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the effect of changes in state aid is more amplified. It could also be structural; county
governments may generally be able to adapt to changes in state aid and transfers, and could be
able to substitute lost funding from that aid from other sources. Additionally, it could be that
there is some unaccounted for unique characteristic to New York that is not present overall
nationally which is amplified by performing analysis specifically on that state. There are two
potential options to determine if one of these reasons is reflected in the research. Future research
could either conduct the county level analysis for a broader number of states, or determine the
effects on specific levels of government by splitting the aggregate local spending data into
county, city, municipality, special district, and other levels and running the analysis individually.
Limitations and Future Research Recommendations
There are some limitations that should be accounted for. Although I do think that I had an
adequate amount of data to conduct the evaluation, having the missing data for 2001 and 2003 to
include in the regressions would make the analysis more complete. It might also be worth
consideration to analyze a longer period of time to capture any variations that might have occur
due to long term political factors. There may also be additional variables that affect state aid and
transfers to local governments beyond what I have included, such as whether a given year in
each state is an election year. Likewise, collecting data on local political factors might provide an
additional level of analysis, as variables for local political data could affect local expenditure
decisions.
When considering future research on this topic, expanding the list of variables and the
time period of data collection might be considered in order to further develop the model.
Additionally, reframing the model around more specific dependent variables where available
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could narrow the focus in a way that determines the effects of state aid and transfers on specific
types of spending, such as education, public health, public safety, or administrative expenditures.
Conclusion
After conducting an analysis for two datasets – one that measures effects on local
expenditures for all fifty states with aggregate local data, and one that measures effects on local
expenditure for New York’s county level data to capture local variation, my hypothesis that state
mechanisms to provide funding to local governments is a statistically significant factor on local
government expenditures on services and other projects was supported. This is reflected both in
the aggregate local data for all fifty states where a 6.8% change in state IG revenue results in a
2.3% change in local expenditure, and also for the county government level for the state of New
York, where a 40% change in state aid results in a 2.5% change in local expenditures. While
these percentages might seem relatively small, a 2.5% reduction in expenditures could have a
significant impact when those expenditures go to public services, such as education or public
health or safety. When the option for local governments is to either reduce the provision of those
services or to find other funding mechanisms such as increasing local taxes, it may be worth
consideration to those responsible for state budgeting to consider the effects of state level
funding cuts, particularly if those cuts include funding for local governments.
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